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THE ETHICS OF JOHN STUART MILL. Edited with Introductory Essays by *Charles Douglas, M. A., D. Sc.* Lecturer and Assistant in Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1897. Pages, cxxvi and 233. Price, 6 shillings net.

The reception accorded to Dr. Douglas's former work on the philosophy of John Stuart Mill offers a sufficient justification, were this needed, for the publication of the present volume, which deals particularly with Mr. Mill's ethical system. This forms so great an advance on the crude utilitarianism of Bentham, that its study is of great importance to those who would understand the bearings of modern hedonism. Dr. Douglas's present work is admirably adapted for the purposes of such study, for it not only reproduces from Mill's writings all that is required to obtain a perfect knowledge of his views, with an introductory Analysis to enable the reader to see clearly their most salient features, but it shows the influences which affected the development of Mill's ideas and points out where they are insufficient. The work is divided into two parts, the latter of which consists of Mill's "Utilitarianism," preceded by the chapters from his "System of Logic" in which that conception is developed, and the former of three Introductory Essays, followed by the Analysis. These Introductory Essays will naturally attract the most attention as giving the author's own opinions on Mill's system. They treat of "Ethics and Induction," "Ethics and Psychology," and "Ethics and Morality."

In the first named of these essays Dr. Douglas traces to its sources Mill's idea of an inductive science of character, which with him formed an important feature of political economy, as being the necessary basis of social science. Mill regarded society from the individual standpoint, instead of considering the individual from the point of view of society, as is now more usually accepted as the proper course. Hence a knowledge of individuals is essential, and it is not surprising that Mill was profoundly influenced by Hartley's Associationism and his related doctrine of Vibrations; although he was not prepared to accept the application of physiological principles for the explanation of mental states unless he was convinced that psychological analysis was not adequate to furnish it. Dr. Douglas does well to refer to Mill's dissatisfaction with the term "necessity" in relation to human conduct, which he rightly treated as simple determination by antecedents, volition not being otherwise bound.

In his second essay, Dr. Douglas deals with Mill's theory of morality, which he regards as marred by its dependence on a psychological conception of conduct. Ethology, the science of character, is treated by Mill as a branch or application of psychology, a view which renders such a result inevitable. As thus limited, no account can be taken of the internal or organic unity which constitutes the self, seeing that psychology is restricted to inference from the observed facts of mental life. Mill was aware, as Dr. Douglas points out, of the incompleteness of his account of mind, recognising that "the organic unity and continuity which characterise experience, and without which there would not be knowledge, depend upon the relation

of experience to a single knowing subject which is not a mere series of conscious states." And yet his psychological method prevented him from giving a proper basis to his system of ethics, and rendered his theory of volition incomplete. It does not allow sufficient account to be taken either of the unconscious factor which, as the expression of heredity, must largely affect the conduct, or of the personal life which exhibits itself in voluntary actions.

The ultimate problem of ethics is the discovery of the principle by which the moral judgment is determined, and Dr. Douglas in his essay on "Ethics and Morality" considers how far Mill was successful in dealing with it. By his assertion that pleasures vary in quality as well as in quantity, which is consistent with the higher position he assigns to virtue as a governing principle of human conduct, he provided a means of transforming earlier utilitarianism, the basis of which is changed when it is affirmed that the wise and the good know what *ought* to be liked. We are told that Mill's criticism of Bentham, which is given in the Appendix to the present volume, took its special form under the influence of Coleridge and Wordsworth and, at second hand, of German Idealism. While accepting Bentham's method, Mill rejected many of his opinions, his estimate of which may be formed from his statement, that "every human action has three aspects: its *moral* aspect, or that of its *right* and *wrong*; its *aesthetic* aspect, or that of its *beauty*; its *sympathetic* aspect, or that of its *lovableness*. The first addresses itself to our reason and conscience; the second to our imagination; the third to our human fellow-feeling. . . . Sentimentality consists in setting the last two of the three above the first; the error of moralists in general, and of Bentham, is to sink the two latter entirely." Surely Mill was not far from the truth; but he erred in viewing human action from too limited a standpoint. Conduct is right, beautiful and lovable, when it is in accordance with the principles of truth. Hence Mill's three aspects are merely different aspects of the true, and as truth is cosmical its sanctions must not be sought for merely in man himself. Nature works through man for the establishment of the principles of truth, which are eternal and are as consistent with human suffering as with human happiness. The aim of Nature is perfection in her works, and although on the broadest survey of her operations the greatest happiness of the greatest number will be found to prevail, yet at the furthest this can never be more than a *criterion* of conduct, the vital principle of which must always be truth.

C. S. W.

THE MYTHS OF ISRAEL. The Ancient Book of Genesis with Analysis and Explanation of Its Composition. By *Amos Kidder Fiske*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1897. Pages, x, 355. Price, \$1.50.

Although the author of *The Myths of Israel* does not make claim to originality of investigation into the sources of what is usually termed Old Testament "history," he has done that without which originality in these days of criticism is of little value. He has studied the work of others in the same field for the purpose